Several theories of externalities and asymmetric information suggest a positive role for government programs to assist credit markets, though potential distortions by special interests carry attendant dangers. The authors examine the empirical association between funding by several federal government programs and subsequent economic performance, measured six ways, for U.S. metropolitan areas during the 1990s. Significant differences are found across programs and performance measures. Observed trade-offs suggest a need to compare policy objectives with acceptable costs in many cases. Overall, the results are consistent with theoretical predictions and with some standard policy objectives.
I n recent years, the U.S. federal government has assisted more than one third of all borrowing by nonfederal sectors through a combination of subsidies, guarantees, and direct lending (Gale, 1991) . The value of these subsidies has been estimated by the Office of Management and Budget to range as high as 32% of the gross value of borrowing (Gale, 1991, p. 139) . Government programs to assist in the provision of credit are also common in other countries. An important question for public policy is the extent to which these programs confer measurable benefits that justify their considerable costs.
A few studies have addressed this question with mixed results. Gale (1991) estimated that aggregate welfare losses from U.S. federal credit subsidies total about 0.25% to 0.4% of Gross Domestic Product, or $10 billion to $15 billion in 1987 alone, under various assumptions. A survey by Schwarz (1992) concluded that directed credit programs in the United States have had a limited impact on growth, in part because their objective is often aimed at equity rather than growth. Crosscountry analysis by Sala-i-Martin (1997) found no significant association between government spending (including investment) and economic growth, whereas Odedokun (1996) found lower incremental output-capital ratios in developing countries with more directed credit through development bank lending. More recent analysis by Wurgler (2000) has found that state ownership in the economy is negatively correlated with economic growth rates, apparently because of misallocation of resources. On the other hand, Calomiris and Himmelberg (1999) documented several dimensions of economic benefit from Japanese programs of directed credit in the machine tool industry, and Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2005) estimated a small but statistically significant positive empirical association between loan guarantees by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and local economic growth, explaining this association as a reduction in adverse selection and moral hazard made possible by the SBA's implicit subsidy.
This article undertakes the natural and important step of testing directly for an empirical association between selected U.S. federal credit programs and subsequent economic performance. The programs under analysis span both direct lending and credit guarantees in the areas of business credit and housing loans by four major federal agencies. We improve on previous studies by employing six complementary measures of economic performance. Shaffer, Collender / Federal Credit Programs 29 Most studies of economic performance have focused on a single measure of outcomes, typically income growth rates (e.g., Collender & Shaffer, 2003; Craig et al., 2005; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Wurgler, 2000) . However, Hall and Jones (1999) emphasize the importance of studying levels of economic aggregates as measures of performance, based on both theoretical models of government policies and cross-country empirical results suggesting that differences in growth rates are merely transitory. In addition, the importance of studying volatility in growth rates is supported by the findings of Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Kurz (2004) . We measure economic performance as the mean and standard deviation over time of growth rates in real per capita income, the mean and standard deviation over time in the growth rates of local establishment employment, the mean level of real per capita income, and the standard deviation over time of the level of real per capita income.
Our results indicate that funding levels are significantly associated with multiple measures of economic performance, that different programs are associated with differing effects, and that trade-offs are often observed in which an apparent benefit in one dimension of economic performance is offset by a cost in another dimension. These findings underscore the need to examine more than one measure of economic performance and suggest that previous studies that focused on a single measure of outcomes may yield misleading policy conclusions. The empirical associations accord with several theoretical predictions and policy objectives as well as suggest additional avenues for future research.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: The next section reviews previous studies and provides a conceptual framework to motivate and interpret the empirical analysis; the following section discusses our data and sample; the next two sections outline our empirical research design, present the empirical model, report the empirical results, and characterize some aspects of robustness. The next section interprets the results and discusses some implications for appropriate research methods and public policy, with a final section that summarizes the findings and enumerates some issues for future study.
Background and Related Literature
Previous studies have suggested several mechanisms by which government credit programs could potentially confer net economic benefits. Many of these explanations assume some market failure because of informational constraints or externalities. Calomiris and Himmelberg (1999) suggest that private lenders may suboptimally finance viable projects that involve large start-up costs and long payback lags because of a free rider problem that may preclude credible commitment to long-term borrower relationships. There, direct financing by the government can relax borrowing constraints faced by firms and thus potentially facilitate greater economic development. Likewise, some industries may display positive externalities in product and factor markets, including spillover effects across firms via technological improvements and worker training; these effects amplify the social impact of credit constraints, reinforcing the role of government credit programs. Furthermore, government credit may have a useful role in smoothing the transition for declining industries (Calomiris & Himmelberg, 1999) .
Many government credit programs provide guarantees to private sector lenders rather than direct financing. Such guarantees may allow lenders to charge lower interest rates, mitigating both an adverse selection problem and moral hazard by borrowers (Craig et al., 2005; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) . Adverse selection arises when lower risk borrowers avoid expensive lenders in favor of cheaper sources of funds, whereas high-risk borrowers face no better alternative and must borrow from expensive sources. This response can promulgate a low-output equilibrium in which credit is not extended to some viable borrowers at any price (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) . Moral hazard arises when a high price of credit induces borrowers to choose riskier projects in the hope of generating higher returns to cover the high financing costs.
Whether direct or indirect, government credit programs may also improve welfare through other mechanisms. Because a national government ideally represents the entire economy and society, its perspective should internalize all domestic externalities and reflect the full set of available diversification. This is a major basis for modeling the government as capable in principle of implementing valid social objectives according to socially consistent discount rates, levels of risk aversion, and other key parameters. The federal government's intrinsically aggregate perspective, although a potential handicap with regard to localized, idiosyncratic information, may also confer a comparative advantage with regard to information about the condition and outlook of the macroeconomy. Similarly, the federal government is typically in the best position to anticipate future changes in federal regulatory policy that could affect the outcome of financial investments.
One possible benefit of government credit programs that appears not to have been discussed in the literature 30 Economic Development Quarterly involves a general equilibrium interaction with monetary and fiscal policy and with exogenous variations in local economic conditions. 1 Because of its scale, the federal government has an intrinsically significant effect on the economy. Monetary policy is designed to optimize much of that impact to the extent possible, but widespread integration of modern financial markets constrains monetary policy to apply uniformly across the nation. On the fiscal side, federal tax policy likewise applies uniformly nationwide. Yet federal expenditures are directed locally or regionally-for example, defense contracts are awarded for specific projects to individual suppliers, research grants are allocated to specific universities, and infrastructure is installed at the local level-and exogenous variations in local economic conditions often make a "one-size-fits-all" economic policy suboptimal for specific regions. Government credit programs, both direct and indirect, provide local injections of economic stimulus that, in principle, can offset the regional asymmetry of other government expenditures and furthermore permit regional adjustments of the degree of stimulus in accord with local economic conditions and needs. As such, government credit programs offer an additional tool of macroeconomic policy that is complementary to, and has unique strengths compared to, monetary and fiscal policy.
At the same time, government credit programs pose specific risks, both hypothetically and in practice. Calomiris and Himmelberg (1999) conjecture that the market failures outlined earlier may be overcome by more sophisticated private-capital markets found in some developed economies, rendering government assistance redundant; indeed, the firms in their sample with "main bank" connections did not exhibit the same empirical benefits from government financing as did other firms. Even well-motivated government programs may fall prey to capture by special interest groups, have the unintended consequence of crowding out private investment that would have occurred otherwise, or divert resources away from other productive uses or sectors (Calomiris & Himmelberg, 1999) . Credit assistance from government sources may often involve a centralized component of allocation, which may incorporate less borrower-specific information than do local private investors and thus risk lower allocative efficiency. This problem is more likely to arise in direct lending than in credit guarantees and thus would predict a systematic difference in the economic effects of the two types of programs, which we explore later.
The mechanisms already discussed need not apply uniformly across all types of markets. Informational asymmetries that hinder private-capital markets may be more severe in large complex markets than in small, homogeneous, relatively transparent communities. One example is adverse selection among borrowers, which theory and empirical evidence have indicated to be worse in markets with more lenders (Broecker, 1990; Nakamura, 1993; Riordan, 1993; Shaffer, 1998) . Likewise, the free rider problem is likely to be more severe in larger markets with more lenders. Similarly, any other externalities that could distort private sector investment decisions and lead to economic underperformance are likely to be less severe in smaller communities. This reasoning suggests greater scope for government financing programs to mitigate informational hindrances to economic growth and similar market failures in metropolitan areas than in nonmetropolitan areas. Accordingly, this article uses a sample of metropolitan markets.
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Although the earlier considerations apply most obviously to average (first-moment) levels or growth rates of economic performance, other considerations apply to its variability (i.e., the second moment of the distribution of outcomes). Heterogeneity among decision makers because of human fallibility can result in greater variability of economic performance in more centralized decision processes (Almeida & Ferreira, 2002; Sah, 1991; Sah & Stiglitz, 1991) . A similar outcome is predicted to the extent that (a) centralized decision processes are less successful at managing conflict and (b) distributional conflicts impair efficient adjustments to exogenous shocks (Almeida & Ferreira, 2002; Rodrik, 1999) . If government credit programs entail more centralized decisions than does private lending, these hypotheses imply that economic performance should be more variable where government credit programs are more active.
3 Conversely, if government credit (direct or indirect) is allocated with a motive of economic stabilization, then we might expect less variability where government credit is deployed. This empirical question assumes greater practical importance in light of recent work by Kurz (2004) , who establishes that the ex-ante social cost of aggregate economic volatility is immense, and thus, the potential economic benefits of stabilization are substantial. The importance of investigating empirical second-moment growth patterns is further underscored by the findings of Ramey and Ramey (1995) that countries with higher volatility in growth rates-both in general and as specifically induced by government spending-exhibit slower average growth.
These conflicting considerations motivate the importance of empirical research on government credit programs versus economic performance-not as a one-shot answer to the associated questions or even as a mere aid to the design and implementation of future programs but more broadly as an ongoing effort to monitor the consistent effectiveness of established programs. Calomiris and Himmelberg (1999) portray their findings as atypical and caution against drawing any blanket endorsement of government credit programs from such an isolated empirical example. We concur with that perspective and offer the following analysis as part of a larger research program aimed at characterizing such programs across a range of times and settings.
Sample and Data
For this research, we painstakingly constructed a unique data set from four principal sources: data on local lending through federal direct and guaranteed loan programs from the Consolidated Federal Funds Reports (CFFR, 1990 (CFFR, -2000 , data on local economic performance from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 1990 (BEA, -2000 of the U.S. Department of Commerce, local demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau (1990) , and banking data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, 1990 (FDIC, -2000 . The data set is similar to that used by Collender and Shaffer (2003) , with the exception of the CFFR data. Therefore, this discussion focuses on the features and interpretation of the CFFR data.
The Census Bureau has collected CFFR data annually from each federal department or agency since 1983, though the early years are not considered reliable. Our data cover the fiscal years from 1990 through 2000. We compute per capita estimates by dividing by local population estimates from the Census Bureau and deflate by the consumer price index (not seasonally adjusted) with 1982 to 1984 as the base years.
Federal funds data may represent either expenditures or obligations. Direct loans and loan guarantees are reported according to the volume of loans obligated and do not take into account interest receipts or principal payments. Consequently, these data do not always correspond to program totals reported in government budget documents, such as budget authority, outlays, or obligations (see Appendix A for definitions of federal budget concepts).
The CFFR divides federal government spending into grants, salaries and wages, procurement, direct retirement and disability payments, other direct payments for individuals, direct payments other than for individuals, direct loans, guaranteed or insured loans, and insurance. Dollar amounts reported for loans represent neither actual expenditures nor obligations but rather the contingent liability of the federal government associated with the loan. This contingent liability is reported as the gross amount of lending obligated during the fiscal year for both direct and guaranteed (or insured) loan programs. Table 1 lists the sample variables. We use 1993 definitions of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) throughout the sample period. Measures of market concentration of banks and deposit control are derived from the FDIC's (1990 FDIC's ( -2000 annual Summary of Deposits. Local employment growth rates are calculated from BEA estimates of county-level employment. Per capita personal income is calculated from BEA estimates of county populations and personal incomes adjusted for inflation using the national consumer price index. To control for educational attainment, we use data from the U.S. Census Bureau (1990) on the percentage of adult population in each county graduated from high school at the start of the relevant decade.
Program Characteristics
Our objective is to investigate the impact of federal lending on local economic well-being. To do so, we focus on direct and guaranteed or insured loan programs. Direct loan programs include those that make commodity loans and purchases, emergency loans, farm ownership loans, farm operating loans, soil and water loans, irrigation system rehabilitation and betterment loans, intermediary relending programs, rural housing repair and housing loans for low-income families, economic injury disaster loans, physical disaster loans, loans for small businesses, direct investment loans, water and waste disposal systems for rural communities, community facilities loans, and rural economic development loans.
Guaranteed or insured loan programs include those that issue farm operating loans, farm ownership loans, soil and water loans, business and industrial loans, small business investment company loans, small business loans, state and local development company loans, surety company bond guarantees, certified development company (504) loans, foreign investment guarantees, community facilities loans, rural electrification and rural telephone loans and loan guarantees, rehabilitation mortgage insurance, home mortgage insurance (especially of low-and medium-income families' and veterans' homes and nursing homes), and higher education insured loans.
Our sample includes the portion of these loan programs that have credible local information on their lending activities and that were funded throughout the 1990s. Because we are interested in evidence concerning program design, we chose two types of lending that are undertaken through both direct and guaranteed programs and through multiple agencies with at least one agency being the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA): those aimed at small businesses (including farms) and those aimed at housing. At least one other federal agency undertakes similar lending, with the SBA dominating small business lending and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) dominating housing lending. In addition, both types of programs are undertaken through direct and guaranteed programs. 4 We omit infrastructure lending because their flows of costs and benefits are attenuated over time and often cross county lines so that local funding and impact are difficult to track. Table 1 also reports descriptive statistics for the data set. The average metropolitan area in our sample has 129 banking offices, a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 0.16, and aggregate deposits of $5.6 billion. 5 To the extent that banking structure affects local economic growth rates, as found by prior studies, it is relevant that geographic regulations in U.S. banking have been progressively relaxed in the past 30 years. On average, outof-market banks controlled 29% of bank offices and 28% of deposits. The correlation between the numbers of inmarket-and out-of-market-owned bank offices is 0.48; the correlation between employment growth and per capita real income growth was 0.38.
Sample Statistics and Correlations

Research Design and Empirical Model
Our choice of empirical method is influenced by several unique considerations of the federal credit programs under analysis. First, funding allocated in a given year may be disbursed over several years, rather than within the current calendar year. This is particularly the case with infrastructure projects that can take many years to complete once authorized and funded but is also a consideration with some types of business lending (e.g., some direct farm operating loans) where disbursements may occur at intervals even though the total loan amount has been authorized and approved. The difference between the federal fiscal year (currently starting on October 1) and the calendar year is a further complication. In addition, funds remaining at the end of a fiscal year revert to the U.S. Treasury in many programs, creating an incentive for program staff to obligate remaining funds in the final months of the fiscal year. These funds almost surely are not disbursed until the next fiscal year, and their economic impact lags the disbursement. Thus, reported funding figures do not correspond exactly to the actual pattern of available funds.
A second consideration is that the pattern of economic performance associated with a one-time injection of credit is likely to be different from that associated with an ongoing multiyear flow of funding. A third special consideration is that the likely mechanisms relating actual disbursements to local economic performance suggest some temporal lags, with any benefits ultimately accumulating over several years. These considerations all indicate that a strict year-by-year panel estimation, as commonly employed in other recent empirical growth studies, could yield grossly misleading results.
Therefore, we allow for intertemporal integration of both the program inputs and the subsequent economic performance by comparing funding patterns averaged over a 5-year period (1990 to 1995) with economic performance over a subsequent 5-year period (1996 to 2000) . Some prior empirical studies of endogenous growth have employed a similar intertemporal aggregation of data (e.g., Collender & Shaffer, 2003; King & Levine, 1993; Levine, 1998; Levine & Zervos, 1998) .
Some of the programs, at least, will likely generate new jobs and income within the first year or two of the disbursement of funds. Although most of the housing loans would finance the acquisition of existing housing stock and thus would not spawn new construction, any business loans made for new or growing businesses will likely be followed shortly by new jobs and income. One question of interest for public policy and welfare is how the benefits of such programs are distributed between the short run and the long run. 6 Our use of consecutive nonoverlapping 5-year time periods implicitly focuses on medium-term benefits; this point is discussed in more detail later.
Another benefit of our choice of relative time periods is to mitigate the potential for spurious (reverse) causality. Although, as in previous empirical growth studies, our data and techniques cannot prove causality, measuring the statistical associations with a multiyear lag greatly reduces the likelihood that changes in economic outcomes are driving changes in funding.
7 This lag structure permits a generic interpretation of the estimates in terms of Granger-type causality. 8 Nevertheless, it is likely that some of the business funding in the earlier 5-year period may result in legitimately stronger economic outcomes before the start of the second 5-year period in our sample. For example, funds allocated in 1991 and disbursed in 1992 may yield stronger economic growth in 1993 and 1994. Even if the higher levels of income and employment persist beyond 1995, growth measures would fail to capture this benefit across the time periods defined in our model. Thus, to that extent, our growth estimates will tend to understate any net economic benefits of business funding, particularly those arising in the short run. Overall, therefore, our use of nonoverlapping 5-year periods represents a necessary compromise in balancing these two effects of business credit. 9 Housing loans, by contrast, may have a similar impact on the local economy as infrastructure investments, which are typically longer term. In that regard, truncating the performance measures after 5 years may understate the long-run component of benefits.
At the same time, any persistent economic benefit will be captured by the levels of income and employment, which is another reason to examine these outcomes in addition to pure growth rates. It is not clear how the use of lagged data might affect the measured association with economic stability; by its nature, any benefit in the dimension of greater stability must necessarily persist somewhat over time, so that missing the first year or two of such an effect should not alter the qualitative findings.
To avoid bias because of rent-seeking and capture effects by specific sectors or industries, we measure economic performance at the aggregate level within individual MSAs. Our primary measures revolve around real per capita income, which we characterize variously by average level over 5 years, average annual growth rate over 5 years, standard deviation of annual levels over 5 years, and standard deviation of average annual growth rate over 5 years. As a vector of secondary measures, we also look at the marketwide number of jobs, measured alternately as the average annual growth rate over 5 years and standard deviation of the annual growth rate over 5 years.
As noted earlier, the majority of empirical growth studies have focused on average growth rates as the indicator of economic performance. However, equilibrium models of economic dynamics often predict a convergence of economic growth rates across countries or regions to a uniform long-run rate (Barro & Sala-iMartin, 1992; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992) , consistent with low serial correlations of growth rates documented empirically by Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers (1993) . These considerations suggest that long-run differences in economic performance are best studied in terms of levels rather than growth rates of income or other indicators (Hall & Jones, 1999) .
Finally, the importance of studying volatility in growth rates is supported by the findings of Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Kurz (2004) . Previous empirical studies of the determinants or correlates of income levels and of growth volatility have been confined to cross-country samples; to the authors' knowledge, this model represents the first local-level U.S. study of these aspects of economic performance.
We should note that although the policy goal of business funding is to stimulate production, income, employment, and other traditional measures of economic outcomes, housing credit follows a different policy goal.
It is entirely possible that housing loans could fully succeed in meeting their policy objectives (facilitating home ownership by a larger segment of the population) without yielding any measurable changes in the levels, growth rates, or dispersion of income or jobs. An interesting and hitherto overlooked question is whether housing credit programs exhibit costs or, perhaps, unexpected benefits in those dimensions.
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Regressions are estimated for each of the six measures of economic performance described earlier. For each such measure, one regression model included funding from each of the federal programs listed in Table 2 as a separate variable, along with a control vector described later. A separate set of regressions aggregated these funding variables in various ways, both to explore sensitivity to levels of aggregation and to permit formal hypothesis tests concerning differential effects of different programs.
Because a Jarque-Bera test strongly rejected normality of the residuals, each regression was estimated using the Least Absolute Distance (LAD) estimator using TSP software, with coefficient standard errors calculated under the assumption of a Laplace distribution of the residuals.
11 LAD estimates are maximum likelihood and hence asymptotically unbiased and efficient when the errors follow the Laplace distribution (Narula & Wellington, 1982) , although, like ordinary least squares (OLS), LAD can yield biased estimates when residuals are asymmetrically distributed. Though LAD is more robust than OLS in the presence of outliers or nonnormal residuals, its standard errors cannot be corrected for heteroscedasticity (Smith & Huang, 1995) . However, this limitation does not seem to cause a problem in our sample, as a Lagrange multiplier test failed to reject the null Note: The importance of farm, rural business, and rural housing programs in a metropolitan sample stems from the fact that many counties included in metropolitan statistical areas have significant rural or agricultural areas (including the most important agricultural counties in California).
hypothesis of homoscedasticity at conventional levels in nearly all regressions.
The conditioning information set in each regression comprises a control vector of variables found to be significantly associated with economic performance in previous empirical growth studies. As listed in Table 1 , they include the natural logarithm of the county population as of 1990, the population density per square mile as of 1990, the number of commercial banks in the county, the HHI of bank deposits in the county, real bank deposits per capita in the county, the average real per capita income in the county during the time period from 1990 to 1995, and the percentage of adults who had graduated from high school as of 1990.
The logarithm of population is a measure of market size, as in Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Schleifer (1995) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) . Previous theory and empirical findings suggest that this variable will be positively associated with economic performance, implying positive coefficients with respect to average levels or growth rates of income or employment but negative coefficients with respect to the intertemporal standard deviation of income or employment.
Population density or employment has been found to be significantly related to several measures of economic performance, possibly because of scale effects or superior matching between firms and workers in denser markets. Andersson, Burgess, and Lane (2007) find that the correlation between workers' skills and productivity at the establishment level is larger in counties with denser populations. Ciccone and Hall (1996) find that population densities at the county level help explain differences in productivity levels across states. Carlino, Chatterjee, and Hunt (2005) find more patents per capita in metropolitan areas with higher employment densities, whereas Strumsky, Lobo, and Fleming (2005) find that the number of patents is positively related to the population density across metropolitan areas. These findings suggest that density will be positively associated with economic performance in our sample.
We control for the local market structure of financial intermediation because 75% of all net credit advanced is channeled through financial intermediaries (Moran, 1985) and because other studies have established an empirical linkage between financial structure and growth (e.g., Cetorelli & Gambera, 2001; Collender & Shaffer, 2003; Levine, Loayza, & Beck, 2000; Rajan & Zingales, 1998) . Likewise, Craig et al. (2005) find a significant effect of local deposit concentration in their growth model. King and Levine (1993) use a variable similar to our real bank deposits per capita (i.e., rdeppc) to control for the relative supply of funds and the intensity of financial intermediation. The three measures of bank structure and financial intermediation used here are generally based on these previous models and findings.
Education reflects the accumulated level of human capital and is expected to be positively associated with economic performance. The initial level of per capita income is intended to capture the convergence effect noted by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and would thus exhibit a negative association with subsequent economic performance. Both variables are similar to those used in recent studies of economic growth such as Glaeser et al. (1995) , Rajan and Zingales (1998) , Levine et al. (2000) , Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) , and Collender and Shaffer (2003) .
The basic regression equation to be estimated is
where y is a measure of economic performance during 1996 to 2000, x is a vector of federal funding measures from 1990 to 1995, z is a vector of market-specific control variables, ε is a stochastic error term, α is the estimated intercept, and β and γ are parameter vectors to be estimated. Table 1 lists the names, definitions, and summary statistics of all dependent and independent variables used in the regressions. A separate regression is estimated for each alternative measure of economic performance, and alternative specifications use various levels of aggregation for the funding variables x. Table 3 presents simple pairwise correlation coefficients between each funding variable and each measure of economic performance as a preliminary step to motivate the more detailed multiple regression models reported earlier. Correlations exceed 0.3 only between the average growth rate of employment and three categories of funding (total housing credit, non-USDA funding, and the subcategory of housing credit guaranteed by HUD), and between the standard deviation of income levels (denoted as rpciSD) and housing credit guaranteed by the Veterans Administration. (See Table B1 of Appendix B; correlations exceeding 0.3 in absolute magnitude appear among several pairs of control variables.) Table 4 reports LAD funding estimates, and Table B2 in Appendix B reports LAD estimates of coefficients on the control variables for the program-specific regressions. At the highest level of aggregation, total funding (TF) was significantly associated with only two of the six measures of economic performance: positive associations with the average growth rate of employment (beneficial) and the volatility of real per capita income (detrimental). Total business funding is significantly associated with only one measure of economic performance: a negative (beneficial) coefficient in the regression on the volatility of employment growth (i.e., EgthSD). Two categories (total housing credit and total non-USDA credit) show significantly positive coefficients in the regressions on employment growth volatility, income volatility (both detrimental), and employment growth rates (beneficial). Total USDA funding exhibits only one significant association, a negative (beneficial) coefficient on employment growth volatility.
Results
Coefficients vary across program categories. Direct business lending by the SBA and housing credit by the USDA are associated with significantly more stable per capita income growth (i.e., lower YgthSD). Three other program categories (guaranteed business credit by the USDA and, weakly, guaranteed housing lending by HUD and the Veterans Administration) are associated with less stable income growth.
At a higher level of aggregation, no funding variables are significantly associated with differences in income growth stability, and the model's explanatory power is low for this measure of economic performance. By contrast, every aggregated category of funding except total funds is significantly associated with differences in the stability of employment growth. Negative (beneficial) associations occur with total business credit and total credit extended by the USDA. Positive (adverse) associations appear with total housing credit and non-USDA credit (weakly). Two individual program categories (direct business lending by the USDA and direct housing credit by HUD) are strongly associated with the stability of employment growth; the negative coefficient implies a beneficial association in this dimension.
The explanatory power of the regressions on the average level of real per capita income is quite high, with Rsquares exceeding 0.9. Two individual program categories are significantly associated with this measure of economic performance: housing credit by the USDA and guaranteed housing credit by the Veterans Administration. No aggregated credit categories are significantly associated with average per capita income levels.
Similarly, two individual program categories are significantly associated with the average growth rate of real per capita income, both negatively (adversely): direct business lending by the SBA (weakly) and direct housing credit by HUD. No aggregated credit categories are significantly associated with this performance measure.
Two individual program categories and more than half of the aggregated program categories are significantly associated with volatility of income levels (i.e., rpciSD). Negative (beneficial) associations appear for direct housing credit by HUD, whereas positive (adverse) associations appear for guaranteed housing credit by the Veterans Administration, TF, total housing credit, and total non-USDA funding. A similar pattern occurs for the average growth rate of employment, though all the significant associations here are positive (beneficial). Among the individual program categories, significant associations arise for guaranteed business credit by the SBA, housing credit by the USDA, and guaranteed housing credit by both HUD and the Veterans Administration. Among the aggregated program categories, significant associations appear for TF, total housing credit, and total non-USDA funding. Thus, at the aggregate level, programs that appear beneficial in terms of employment growth also appear to impose a cost in terms of more volatile income levels, and two such categories (total housing credit and total non-USDA credit) are also associated with more volatile employment growth.
Assessing the magnitude of the significant associations, we see that an increase of one standard deviation of TF in the programs studied is associated with a detrimental increase of 4.3% in the standard deviation of income growth rates (7.7% of the sample mean) and a beneficial increase of 17 basis points in the average employment growth rate (8.9% of the sample mean). The largest magnitude of association with employment growth is for total non-USDA funding, where a 1 standard deviation increase is associated with a 39 basispoint increase in the average annual employment growth rate (more than 20% of the sample mean).
The largest association with the volatility of income (i.e., rpciSD) is for housing loans guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (i.e., DHGL), where a one standard deviation increase is associated with a 9.6% higher volatility (17% of the sample mean). The only significantly beneficial association with this performance measure is Table B1 . The last eight rows are from a single regression per column; TF was run in a separate regression; the other four funding variables were included in complementary pairs in separate regressions (TB and TH, TU and NU). This partitioning of funding variables ensures that each program in Table 2 is represented without double counting in each regression. Variable names are defined in Table 1 . *p < .01. **p < .05. ***p < .10.
for direct housing credit by HUD, where a one standard deviation increase is associated with a 1.9% lower volatility (3.4% of the sample mean). This same program (i.e., HHDL) also generated the largest association with the standard deviation of employment growth (a beneficial 14 basis-point reduction, more than 11% of the sample mean) and with the average growth rate of real per capita income (a reduction of 12 basis points or 6.0% of the sample mean). DHGL generated the largest association with the average income level (i.e., rpci), an increase of $180 per year, and is the only program category significantly associated with four performance measures in the sample. An increase of one standard deviation in business loans guaranteed by the USDA is associated with a 21-basis-point increase in the standard deviation of income growth rates (nearly 14% of the sample mean) for the largest association with this performance measure. Table 5 presents formal hypothesis tests based on the regressions reported in Table 4 . The vector of programspecific funds is jointly significant at conventional levels in all regressions, as is the control vector of demographic and financial structure variables. The third row establishes that the various credit programs have significantly different marginal effects on economic performance or, equivalently, that the disaggregated vector of programspecific funds provides a significantly better fit to each measure of economic performance than does the scalar TF. The fourth row rejects the joint hypothesis that all business credit programs have the same effect on economic performance and that all housing credit programs have the same effect on economic performance; equivalently, aggregating the individual program funds into the two categories "business" versus "housing" results in a significant loss of information or fit in all regressions. The fifth row indicates that USDA credit programs have a significantly different association with economic performance from the credit programs of the other agencies included in our sample; equivalently, aggregation by agency (USDA versus all others) results in a significant loss of fit in all regressions.
The last two rows test hypotheses about full aggregation into a scalar funds variable versus partial aggregation along different dimensions. Significant information is lost between the business/housing dichotomy versus scalar funding when economic performance is measured as the average growth rate of employment, its standard deviation, or the standard deviation of real per capita income. The last row reports a similar result for the USDA/other agency dichotomy versus scalar funding for the same three measures of economic performance, though the significance is marginal in the regression on the standard deviation of real per capita income.
Among the control variables, none are significant in every regression, as indicated in Table B2 . More populous MSAs tend to exhibit slower but less volatile income growth along with less volatile employment growth. Population density was weakly associated with faster income growth rates. The number of commercial banks was not significant in any regression, though the other measures of financial structure were highly significant in several specifications. MSAs with higher deposit concentration (HHI) tended to exhibit lower income levels and slower but more volatile employment growth. MSAs with more bank deposits per capita tended to exhibit faster and slightly less volatile employment growth but also more volatile income levels.
Real per capita income levels exhibit strong persistence over time, as the coefficient on the average real per capita income level in the previous 5 years (i.e., mrpci) was slightly above unity and estimated with high precision (t = 68.67 in the rpci regression with individual program categories). Education was significant in all but the last (i.e., Empl) regression, being associated with higher income levels and growth rates (as in previous studies), less volatile income growth rates but more volatile income levels (likely a statistical artifact of more rapid income growth), and less volatile employment growth rates.
Discussion and Interpretation
All estimated associations with employment growth rates and volatility were beneficial-an important result not previously studied but consistent with an oft-stated goal of many government programs. Likewise, the associations between housing credit by the USDA and less volatile income growth, and between direct housing credit by HUD and less volatile income levels, were beneficial.
By contrast, three of the consistently significant associations were detrimental: (a) between the volatility of income growth and guaranteed credit by HUD for housing, (b) between the volatility of income growth and guaranteed credit by the USDA for business, and (c) between the volatility of income levels and total federal credit funding. These second-moment costs have not been previously recognized and point to the importance of extending the study of economic performance to multiple measures that include second-moment effects.
The trade-offs across performance dimensions evident for most credit programs point to the dangers of focusing exclusively on a single measure of economic performance. These results also suggest that policy makers need to think carefully about their objectives and about acceptable costs. However, a few credit programs exhibited no trade-offs under the expanded set of performance measures studied here. Business credit guarantees by the SBA (i.e., SBGL) and direct business lending by the USDA (i.e., UBDL) exhibited beneficial coefficients in one regression each, along with no detrimental outcomes; but UBGL appeared detrimental in one case and was never beneficial.
We should note that the short-run impact of government funds on the level of local income should be positive (indeed, dollar for dollar) to the extent that the funds injected into the local market are derived elsewhere (such as by taxes, bond issuance, or monetization of federal debt). This positive impact, an automatic property of aggregate financial accounting, should be observed regardless of whether the funds are used for short-term consumption or invested to stimulate long-term growth.
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However, whether the funding is one time or ongoing, the financial accounting alone would not generate a change in the subsequent growth rates or volatility of income or employment, and any such impact would require some additional mechanism, such as enhanced local productivity. Indeed, in the absence of enhanced local productivity, a one-time injection of funds in Year 1 could easily result in slower growth rates in Year 2, if local income levels subsequently revert to their previous long-run equilibrium path. Aggregate financial accounting would not by itself generate a higher level of employment as a direct result of government funding, so any empirically observed impact of this sort would provide additional insight into the uses and benefits of the funding.
Moreover, a refined interpretation of the empirical association between government funding and levels of real per capita income (i.e., rpci) will permit a distinction to be drawn between mere financial accounting effects and longer term productivity gains in the funded market. In particular, each dollar of funding that is supported by revenues external to the local market will initially raise the aggregate local income by one dollar; any enhancement to productivity (a longer term, welfare-relevant dimension of our analysis) would manifest itself as a further increase in aggregate local income, either contemporaneously or subsequently. Thus, a multiplier effect is hypothetically possible if the funding programs have a long-run component of welfare enhancement in which the estimated coefficients on the respective funding variables in the rpci regressions exceed unity. This, then, is the more stringent test of program effectiveness as measured in the rpci regressions.
It should be noted that this multiplier test may be excessively stringent for three reasons. First, some of the allocated funds are implicitly derived from the local tax base, so that a smaller positive value of the regression coefficient would be consistent with some form of enhanced productivity. Second, the great majority of funds allocated from 1990 to 1995 would have been disbursed prior to the start of the 1996-2000 performance period and hence will not show up in the form of funding injections into 1996-2000 income. Third, any guarantees that lower a borrower's interest rate will, in effect, merely transfer income from the lender to the borrower; if the lender is local, as is often the case with housing loans or small business loans, the net change in aggregate market income is zero or negligible.
At any rate, DHGL exhibited a coefficient in the rpci regression that significantly exceeded unity, with a point estimate of nearly 6.0. The 95% confidence interval for its coefficient spans 5.19 to 6.76. Thus, we can confidently conclude that this program, at least, is associated with a strong positive multiplier effect in real per capita income levels that exceeds the direct short-run effects resulting from aggregate financial accounting alone.
Summary and Conclusion
This article has explored the empirical association between selected U.S. federal credit programs and subsequent economic performance through the 1990s. Our findings indicate that funding levels are significantly associated with several measures of economic performance. Different federal programs have different measured effects, and trade-offs appear between benefits in one dimension of economic performance versus costs in other dimensions of economic performance. Total aggregate federal funding was associated with significantly faster employment growth (as was total business funding) but also with more volatile incomes.
Overall, the empirical findings are consistent with several theoretical predictions based on externalities and informational asymmetries and with some standard policy objectives. The trade-offs across performance measures point to the dangers of focusing exclusively on any single measure of economic performance and illustrate the need for policy makers to consider explicitly their objectives and acceptable costs. A few programs, however, exhibited no trade-offs in our estimates.
Other issues could be usefully explored by future research. Given the possibility that our lag structure might overlook part of the growth effects of business credit (though probably not the main effects on levels or stability of income or employment nor on any effects of housing credit), future research could investigate alternative lag structures for business credit, taking care not to misconstrue pure financial transfers as net social benefits. Similarly, because the policy goals of housing credit mainly focus on housing conditions and local quality of life rather than on income or employment per se, future research could expand on the housing component of our study by examining alternative measures of outcomes such as local homeownership rates or local housing quality.
An informational problem noted earlier, in which centralized allocative decisions associated with federal direct credit programs may incorporate less borrowerspecific information than lending decisions made by local private investors, suggests that direct credit programs may spawn more inefficient outcomes than guaranteed credit programs. However, this hypothesis could not be tested in our estimates owing to the aggregation of direct and guaranteed USDA housing credit in the available data for the years that we examined. Because those figures in more recent years are disaggregated into direct housing loans and guaranteed housing loans, this question could be addressed using a more recent sample and remains open for future research.
Another issue for further research would be to compare the economic outcomes measured here against those associated with non-government-funded business lending and housing loans. On the one hand, if benefits are observed in some government funding programs but larger benefits were associated with similar loans made without government assistance, one might still question the optimality of the government funding programs to the extent that they divert funds away from more productive uses (a point similar to that raised by Calomiris and Himmelberg, 1999 , as discussed earlier). On the other hand, in cases where no measurable benefit is associated with a particular government program, it might nevertheless be difficult to interpret the programs as wasteful if similar outcomes were found for comparable lending without government assistance, under the assumption that market competition enforced optimality of the purely private sector lending decisions.
Appendix A Budgetary Terms
Budget authority-the authority becoming available during the year to enter into obligations that will result in immediate or future outlays of government funds. In some cases, budget authority can be carried over to following years. It can take the form of appropriations, which permit obligations to be incurred and payments to be made, or authority to borrow, or authority to contract in advance of separate appropriations. Supplemental appropriations provide budget authority when the need for funds is too urgent to be postponed until the next annual appropriations act.
Obligations incurred-once budget authority is enacted, government agencies may incur obligations to make payments. These include current liabilities for salaries, wages, and interests, and contracts for purchase of supplies and equipment, construction, and the acquisition of office space, buildings, and land. With regard to credit programs, we use the total value of the loans obligated or guaranteed.
Outlays-the measure of government spending. Outlays are payments to liquidate obligations (other than repayment of debt), net of refunds and offsetting collections.
Direct loan-the disbursement of funds by the government to a nonfederal borrower under a contract that requires repayment, with or without interest.
Loan guarantee-any guarantee, insurance, or other pledge with respect to the payment of all or a part of the principal or interest on any debt obligation of a nonfederal borrower to a nonfederal lender.
Fiscal year-the U.S. government's accounting period. It begins October 1 and ends September 30 and is designated by the calendar year in which it ends. (Dennis & Williams, 2005) ; incorporating the further interaction with federal credit programs represents a natural and important extension of this research program.
Appendix B
2. A future study by the same authors will focus on nonmetropolitan markets.
3. However, the cross-sectional test proposed by Almeida and Ferreira (2002) may give misleading results if government credit programs have multiple goals, such that (for example) funding is injected into some low-performing markets to prevent further decline but also into some higher performing markets to enhance their productivity and growth even more. Accordingly, we do not include tests of crosssectional variability, focusing our second-moment tests instead on intertemporal volatility.
4. USDA-guaranteed housing loans and direct housing loans were reported together as a single variable, making it impossible to measure the direct and guaranteed components separately.
5. The HHI is the sum of squared market shares. 6. In a different context, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) , Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) , and Rob (1995) have shown that the employment benefits of small firms are mitigated by the fact that jobs at small firms are, on average, more transitory than at large firms.
7. Because federal funding decisions are based on centrally established and administered policy objectives and criteria, one might argue that the potential for reverse causality is much smaller in our research question than in previous empirical growth studies that focused on purely market-driven explanatory factors, such as banking structure. Nevertheless, to the extent that the policy process is itself endogenous (either in the long run or as a function of local representation in the allocative decisions), some potential for reverse causality might remain in our sample so that the mitigation afforded by using consecutive 5-year periods is useful. 8. A variable (x) is said to Granger-cause another (y) if regressions indicate that prior values of x have significant explanatory power for subsequent values of y (Granger, 1969) .
9. Likewise, to the extent that funding in 1996 and 1997 may have spawned increased economic activity in 1998 and 1999, measuring the funding levels only before 1996 will leave more unexplained noise in our regression equations but will not reduce the significance or validity of the estimated coefficients on earlier funding levels. 10. One mechanism by which broader home ownership might be expected to result in higher subsequent levels of income and employment is suggested by McAndrews and Nakamura (1991) . In addition, lenders often view home ownership as linked with job stability and creditworthiness.
11. See surveys of LAD estimators by Narula and Wellington (1982) and Dielman (2005) .
12. The authors are indebted to Charles Calomiris (personal conversation) for this observation. 
